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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAMONA HAYWARD, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
LEO GEORGE EASTMAN, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CA'SE 
No. 8525 
This appeal arises out of an action brought 
by the plaintiff and appellant Ramona Hayward 
against the defendant and respondent Leo George 
Eastman to recover for injuries and damages al-
legedly sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile-
pedestrian accident which occurred on the Lark-
Herriman road on the 26th day of November, 1953 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. Two fundamental ques-
tions are raised by the appeal: 
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1. Was the verdict of the jury justified by 
the evidence? 
2. Were the issues in the case properly sub-
mitted to the jury? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is the wife of Fred Hayward (R. 
111). At the time of the accident they were living 
in Riverton, Utah (R. 112). The plaintiff and her 
family had been invited to the home of Faye and 
Francis Osborne for Thanksgiving, and on the after-
noon of November 25, 1953 at about 4 :00 o'clock 
P.M. the plaintiff went to the Osborne hor.ae to help 
Mrs. Osborne get ready for Thanksgiving the next 
day (R. 112). She and Mrs. Osborne sat around 
drinking coffee, talking and making pie crust (R. 
112). A little after 5:00 o'clock P.M. Mr. Osborne 
arrived home from work (R. 113). Mr. Osborne had 
something to eat and then left to go to the store 
(R. 175-176). At about 7:00 o'clock P.M. a Ralph 
Crane (whose last name, coincidentally, is the same 
as plaintiff's first husband's name, Chester Crane, 
but who, according to the plaintiff, is no relation) 
arrived (R. 113, 155, 158). He had been drinking 
and was drunk at the time he arrived (R. 113, 146). 
Mr. Francis Osborne returned from the store 
about 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock P.M. Ralph Crane had 
brought a fifth of whiskey with him (R. 193). The 
group remained at the Osborne home eating sand-
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wiches ( R. 235) and drinking coffee, beer and 
whiskey. During that time the plaintiff admits hav-
ing had one can of beer ; Francis Osborne had one 
drink with Ralph Crane and a can of beer; Ralph 
Crane drank part of the whiskey (R. 147, 176, 
303) . Mrs. Osborne was unable to drink anything 
because she had a sore throat (R. 235). 
At about 10:30 P.M. the group left the Osborne 
home and went to Viv and Arch's (a tavern in 
Riverton) to get a pack of cigarettes for Mrs. Os-
borne (R. 113). Mr. Crane brought the fifth of 
whiskey along and the plaintiff had a drink out 
of that bottle prior to entering Viv and Arch's 
(R. 146, 147). The group remained at Viv & Arch's 
until about 11:30 P.M., during which time more 
beer and whiskey were consumed (R. 148, 149, 227, 
298, 308). The group left Viv & Arch's with the 
intent of going for a ride (R. 236). Ralph Crane 
and Francis Osborne got in the back of the car and 
the plaintiff and Mrs. Osborne sat in the front of 
the car, Mrs. Osborne doing the driving (R. 177). 
Mrs. Osborne drove down Redwood Road to 
West Jordan and then decided to drive to Lark, 
Utah to see her friend, Gertrude Oliver, whose 
husband had recently passed away (R. 236, 240). 
When they arrived at Lark they went by the Oliver 
house but the lights were out so they drove down 
through Lark and started on their way home (R. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
236) on the road between Lark and Herriman, Utah. j 
As they were driving down through a canyon (R. ;; 
237) Mrs. Osborne told the plaintiff that she had 
to go to the bathroom and asked her if she would 
go with her, to which the plaintiff agreed. Where-:1 
upon Mrs. Osborne slowed down and stopped the :,J 
car (R. 237). Mrs. Osborne does not recall what 
happened after that (R. 237). 
•.i 
:;!. 
The area in which Mrs. Osborne stopped the ::1: 
automobile and the area in which the accident oc-
curred is illustrated by two diagrams (Exhibits 
32 and 28). The road in this area is a rather nar-
row two lane hard surface road (see Exhibits 33, 
31 and 32) running in a generally easterly and 
westerly direction. At the west end of the area about 
600 feet from the place where the accident occurred 
as the crow flies the road make a rather sharp turn 
to the southeast from a northeasterly direction and 
then proceeds on around 400 feet where it makes a 
gradual turn back to the east (Exhibit 28). The 
point of impact was located near a telephone pole, ~~ 
the witnesses for the plaintiff testifying that the . 
point of impact was 30 feet west of the telephone 
pole and the police officers and the defendant's 
witnesses testifying that the point of impact was 
30 feet east of the telephone pole. Exhibit 32, which 
is a diagram drawn to scale, illustrates that the 
shoulder of the road west of the telephone pole is 
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Looking W. from point 1 00' E. of pole (with white placard) 
/r ·- · 
I ""l,inn W_ from Doint 150' W. Of pole. 
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quite wide, while the shoulder east of the telephone 
pole is very narrow and was estimated by the police 
officer to be 4 feet wide (Exhibit 41). We have re-
produced for the convenience of the court two photo-
graphs, Exhibits 31 and 33, which are generally 
illustrative of the scene. Exhibit 31 is a view looking 
west along the highway from a point 100 feet 
east of the telephone pole near which the accident 
occurred. Exhibit 33 is a photograph of the same 
highway looking west from a point 150 feet west 
of the telephone pole where the accident occurred. 
In viewing these pictures the court should keep in 
mind that both automobiles in this case were tra-
veling the opposite direction, that is east, to which 
the pictures were taken. The defendant's automo-
bile at the time of impact had come around the 
distant curve shown in Exhibit 33 and had traveled 
all of the highway and up to somewhere in the vi-
cinity of the telephone pole shown in Exhibit 31 at 
the time of impact. The scale diagram, Exhibit 32, 
shows the width of the pavement in the area to vary 
from 17.5 feet to 18 feet. 
Referring to the police report, Exhibit 41, 
which was introduced into the evidence, we find 
that the automobile of the defendant, car No. 1, 
was traveling east and the automobile driven by 
Clara Faye Osborne, car No. 2, was stopped, ac-
cording to the diagram prepared by the police of-
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, ficer, on the highway. The police officer's diagnosis 
of the accident as shown by his investigation re-
port, Exhibit 41, was 
"Car No. 2 was standing in road, no 
lights visible. Car No. 1 came around curve 
and did not see car No. 2 in time to stop com-
pletely, striking two ladies standing behind 
car No. 2." 
The plaintiff testified that after Mrs. Osborne 
had stopped they got out of the car and went up 
on the sidehill and went to the bathroom (R. 115). 
Mter going to the bathroom they returned to the 
road, stopped and looked both ways to see if any-
thing was coming, saw nothing and started behind 
the parked car when she heard a sound and looked 
up to see car lights on the sharp curve (R. 122). 
Plaintiff was dressed in a light tan coat and Mrs. 
Osborne had a grey fur on (R. 154). Plaintiff ex-
tended her hand and said, "Just a minute, Faye, 
here comes a car." She then looked again and the 
car was almost on top of them ( R. 123) . She claims 
that she tried to step back but couldn't (R. 123). 
When she was struck she was about one foot on the 
oiled surface of the highway and about half way 
behind the back end of the car (R. 161, 162). She 
estimated the distance at which she first saw the 
lights of the car to be 600 feet to the west and ad-
mitted that when she first saw the car approaching 
at a distance of about 600 feet she could have avoid-
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ed the accident by walking a few feet to the south 
(R. 153). 
Francis Osborne had gone off in a different 
direction from the car and did not see the actual 
accident, at least not at the time of impact (R. 178). 
Ralph Crane was dozing in the Osborne vehicle 
at the time of the accident (R. 304). The last thing 
that Mrs. Clara Faye Osborne can recall is parking 
her car (R. 237). All of the plaintiff's witnesses 
place the point of impact as about 30 feet west of 
the telephone pole. 
'The occupants of the defendant's car were 
Kenneth R. Parry and the defendant Leo George 
Eastman. They had met earlier in the evening at 
Viv & Arch's Cafe at about 10:15 P.M. (R. 307) 
where Kenneth Parry had consumed two glasses 
of beer (R. 307) and the defendant had had one 
glass of beer. They left Viv & Arch's about 11 :30 
P.M. (R. 308) and went for a ride in Eastman's 
car, ending up at the Drift Inn in Lark, Utah (R. 
309). The defendant Leo George Eastman drove 
the car from Viv & Arch's to Lark, Utah (R. 309). 
They had another glass of beer at the Drift Inn and 
then started back. The defendant had not had his 
automobile very long and he and Kenneth Parry 
had been discussing automobiles, what they liked 
about them, etc. and when they left the Drift Inn 
the defendant asked Parry if he would like to drive 
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the car and see how it handled so that at the time 
' they left Lark, Utah Kenneth Parry was driving 
the automobile (R. 309). As he drove around the 
last curve prior to the point of impact he first saw 
the two people standing in the road (R. 310). His 
first impression that it was a cow or a horse. He 
applied his brakes and thought he was going to stop 
but slid into the two women. He testified that as he 
came around the curve the lights were out on the 
sidehill and that he could not see the women until 
the lights straightened up on the highway again. 
According to this witness the Osborne vehicle was 
on the oiled surface of the highway in the right hand 
lane going east. When he first saw the women they 
were facing each other and as his car drew near 
they turned around and faced him. Neither of them 
made any motion to get off the highway that he 
could see. 
The defendant Leo George Eastman testified that 
they were going around 40 miles per hour traveling 
east and that as the car swerved around to where 
the lights were on the highway he noticed two light 
colored objects which he thought for a minute were 
stock. He estimates that at that time they were 
about 100 feet away and at that time the driver 
Kenneth Parry applied the brakes (R. 357, 359, 
360). He first realized the objects were women when 
they were about 25 feet from them. At that point 
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the women had their backs toward them, facing 
east, and he did not see them make any movement 
to get out of the way ( R. 359). He does not remem-
ber of having seen the Osborne car (R. 35'7). The 
point of impact was about a car or two car lengths 
east of the telephone pole (R. 367). The Osborne 
car was knocked 20 to 25 feet by the impact. The 
Osborne car was standing in the highway, the left 
hand side being right on the yellow line, and facing 
east. He sent Kenneth Parry to a home located 
near the scene, Kaywoods, to call the police (R. 357). 
He then told Mr. Osborne, "The cops or the police, 
ambulance and doctor will soon be here." To which 
Mr. Osborne replied, "We don't want them." (R. 
358) 
Kenneth Parry, Ralph Crane, Mr. Osborne and 
the defendant then pushed the Osborne car off to 
the north side of the road because they were afraid 
another car would hit the car (R. 311). Mrs. Os-
borne was lying in the middle of the road about 
where the yellow line would be and Mrs. Hayward 
was lying a little bit south of her (R. 178). After 
helping to push his car off the highway Mr. Os-
borne then went back and took his wife, and then 
Ramona down to his car and put them in that car 
(R. 179). About that time Mr. Kaywood arrived 
and the two women were loaded into the Kaywood 
car and Mr. Kaywood and Mr. Osborne took off 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the women for the hospital (R. 358). Kenneth 
Parry and the defendant remained at the scene of 
the accident (R. 358) and Ralph Crane took off 
for home ( R. 304). During this time Kenneth Parry . ~ 
had observed Mr. Osborne and he testified that Mr. 
Osborne had been drinking and that he was not too 
steady on his feet (R. 313). 
The investigating officer was Carl George, who 
at that time was a deputy sheriff for Salt Lake 
County ( R. 264) . He was assisted by Occie Evans, 
who was in charge of the traffic department of the 
Sheriff's Office (R. 328). When Deputy Sheriff·-
George arrived at the scene of the accident he found 
Mr. Parry and the two automobiles which had been 
involved in the accident. Neither Mr. Parry nor 
Mr. Eastman was visibly under the influence of 
alcohol at that time (R. 27 4). He found dirt and 
debris on the highway at a point which he assumed 
to be the point of impact, 39 feet east of the tele-
phone pole (see the "x" on Exhibit 32). There were 
two puddles of water directly west approximately 
3 feet from the debris (See the circles on Exhibit 
32, R. 267). There were skid n1arks coming straight 
from the west to the east up to the debris and the 
water (see the lines drawn on Exhibit 32, R. 267). 
These marks were 72 feet in length (R. 267). The 
left hand skid mark was about 3 feet 6 inches from 
the center of the highway (R. 276). He was told 
10 
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that the Osborne car had been moved and found 
it on the north side of the highway, 72 feet from 
the point of impact. The Eastman car was also on 
the north side of the highway, 24 feet from the point 
of impact (R. 291, Exhibit 32). At one other point 
in his testimony he placed the Eastman vehicle at 
32 feet from the point of impact and the Osborne 
vehicle at 84 feet (R. 279). 
The defendant first told the investigating of-
ficer that he was driving the car ( R. 27 4). He later 
told him that Parry was driving and that he had 
told him he was driving because Parry did not have 
a driver's license (R. 275). Mr. Eastman further 
told the investigating officer that they were travel-
ing about 40 miles per hour. They saw the danger 
at 85 feet and the estimated speed at moment of 
impact was 15 miles per hour. 
'The officer took a statement from Kenneth 
Parry (see Exhibit 41) in which Kenneth Parry 
stated: "As we were coming around a bend in the 
road from Lark to Herriman we suddenly saw two 
women standing at the rear of an automobile in 
which we a few seconds later saw there were no tail 
lights on the other car." He stepped on the brakes 
"But we slid into them, going very slow, turned a 
a little to the left." 
When the ambulance arrived Kenneth Parry 
and the defendant were put in the ambulance and 
11 
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they drove around Lark then down to Redwood 
. ' 
Road to West Jordan, then east into Midvale, trying 
to find the Kaywood car. They finally found the 
car in Midvale, whereupon the women and the de-
fendant were taken to the hospital. 
The plaintiff did produce one expert witness, 
Professor Franklin S. Harris. He testified that a 
car with the tail lights turned on could be seen 
just as the driver came around the sharp curve at 
a distance of about 600 feet (R. 246) and that there 
is enough light to get some headlights on the car so 
that the car without tail lights could be seen at 
around 400 feet ( R. 249). He did admit, however, 
that he went out there for the express purpose of 
seeing what he could see and that since he was 
definite'ly looking for an object he would expect 
to see it sooner than a person who was not expecting 
an object to be in the road (R. 249). On direct 
examination he testified that a car laying down 72 
feet of skid marks would be going 42 miles per 
hour (R. 387). On cross examination he testified 
that it would take 84 feet to stop a car going 40 
miles per hour on a highway with a coefficient 
friction of 65%, which is the average coefficient 
friction of the average road surface and the one on 
which the charts of stopping distances are generally 
based (R. 391). 
Upon the basis of this evidence the plaintiff 
12 
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seeks to show that the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law; that the court improperly 
instructed the jury and erred in either admitting 
or not admitting certain testimony. We will answer 
plaintiff's argument under two points, which are: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS 
JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT 2. THE COURT DID NO·T ERR IN AD-
MITTING OR EXCLUDING CERTAIN EVIDENCE OR 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY. 
ARGUMENIT 
POINT 1. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS 
JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The defendant in this case was guilty of negli-
gence which was a proximate cause of this accident 
as a matter of law only if on the basis of the evi-
dence the jury could not reasonably have found 
otherwise. In their analysis the jury were not com-
pelled to limit their inquiry to the testimony set 
out by the plaintiff, assuming for the purpose of 
argument that those bits of evidence standing by 
themselves would warrant a finding that defen-
dant was negligent as a matter of law. Indeed, the 
jury should consider all of the evidence. It is their 
right, within certain limitations which we need not 
mention here, to decide which witnesses they be-
lieve and which witnesses they do not believe, or, 
13 
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to say it otherwise, what evidence they consider to 
be correct and what evidence they consider to be 
incorrect. The trial court has no alternative but 
to submit the matter to them regard1ess of how 
he personally may feel when they reasonably might 
arrive at a different result. The jury might well 
have found from the evidence in this case that these 
defendants, in full possession of their senses, there 
being no evidence of excessiv~ drinking on their 
part, approached the scene of the accident at a 
speed of 40 miles per hour as testified to by the 
defendant and that such a speed was reaonable un-
der the conditions prevailing. The jury might fur-
ther find that because of the nature of the terrain 
the headlights of the defendant's automobile were 
deflected off the highway until just prior to the 
actual impact and that by reason of this fact the 
defendant might not be able to see the women on the 
highway until he was at a distance of some 100 
feet from them, as claimed by him (R. 360); and 
that the driver did not see the women at about that 
point as physically demonstrated by the fact that 
the driver was able to get the brakes on and lay 
down 72 feet of skid marks prior to the actual im-
pact. If we grant that the jury might have so found, 
the authorities cited by plaintiff do not compel a 
determination of this issue in her favor. 
'The case of Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 
14 
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465, 214 Pac. 304 involved a pedestrian who was 
struck while walking on State Street in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. The highway there runs north and 
south at the point where the collision occurred and 
then on to Salt Lake City a distance of 6 or 7 miles. 
In deciding that case the court quoted from Lauson 
v. Fond du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N. W. 629, 25 
L. R. A. (N.S.) 40, 135 Am. St. Rep. 30: 
"The driver of an automobile, who, while 
traveling on a dark, rainy night over a 
straight stretch of strange country road, 
drives his machine at such a rate of speed 
that he cannot bring it to a standstill within 
the distance that he can plainly see objects 
or obstructions ahead of him, is not exercis-
ing ordinary care.'' 
In the case of Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy 
Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 Pac. (2d) 309 we are 
again concerned with a straight stretch of highway. 
Said the court : 
'' * * * As plaintiff approached the place 
where the truck was standing on the night 
in question, the highway was straight and 
level for a distance of at least a mile. The 
truck was directly in front of him and in his 
course of travel. According to his testimony 
he was keeping a constant lookout ahead. If 
he was not keeping a lookout ahead, he was 
guilty of negligence in failing to do so. There 
was nothing to obstruct his view. It was an 
ordinary c1ear, quiet summer night with no 
moon. So far as appears there was nothing 
15 
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to divert his attention from the road in front 
of him. * * * In such case it must inevitably 
follow that plaintiff did not keep a lookout 
ahead, or, if he did, he either did not heed 
what he saw or he could not see the truck 
because his lights were not such as were pre-
scribed by law.'' 
When we come to the case of Nielsen v. Wata-
nabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 Pac. (2d) 117 and introduce 
the element that the driver may not have been able 
to see by reason of some obstruction, a different 
rule is announced. That case involved a demurrer 
to a complaint wherein it was alleged that the bril-
liant lights from a car coming from the opposite 
direction comp1etely blinded and destroyed the vi-
sion of the plaintiff and her husband and destroyed 
the effects of the lights of their own car so that 
they were unable to see defendant's truck parked 
upon the highway. This court held that the court 
below was in error in sustaining the demurrer, and 
said: 
" * * * In the case of Dalley v. Mid-Wes-
tern Dairy Products Co., supra, it was held 
that a nonsuit was properly granted on the 
grounds of contributory negligence where the 
plaintiff, while driving an automobile at night 
along a straight level highway without any-
thing to obstruct his view or detract his at-
tention, ran into a truck without a tail-light 
parked on the highway. None of the cited 
cases are controlling of the case in hand. The 
complaint here questioned is silent as to 
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whether the highway near where the truck 
was parked is straight or crooked, level or 
otherwise. If the truck could not, because of 
some obstruction, be seen as plaintiff and her 
husband approached it prior to the time they 
were blinded, and if plaintiff's husband was 
driving at a lawful rate of speed an auto-
mobile properly equipped with lights and 
brakes without any reason to believe the head-
lights of another automobile would suddenly 
or unexpectedly blind him, that while so 
blinded the collision occurred without time for 
,.. him to reduce his speed or stop his automobile, 
the rule announced in the cases relied upon 
by defendant and heretofore cited in this 
opinion would not apply. Under such circum-
stances it may not be said that plaintiff's 
husband was, as a matter of law, guilty of 
contributory negligence." 
The case of Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 
Pac. (2d) 1366 merely held that a contractor was 
not negligent in placing a barricade which was in-
visible due to a curve until the driver was about 50 
feet away from the barricade. The court in that 
case did not say whether or not the driver of the 
automobile in which the plaintiff was riding was 
guilty of negligence. 
The case of Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, 98 
Utah 253, 98 Pac.· (2d) 363 also involved a de-
~urrer to a complaint in which it was alleged that 
the defendant erected a barricade across the high-
way and that because of accumulation of smoke and 
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mist and impaired visibility by glare of headlights 
the plaintiff could not see the unlighted barricade 
in time to safely avoid running into the same. This 
court he'ld that the complaint alleged a cause of 
action and said of the rule announced in Dalley v. 
Mid-Western Dairy Products 
''* * * While this rule is recognized gen-
erally in other jurisdictions as well as in our 
own, it is certainly not a rule without limita-
tion or restriction." 
Likewise, it was held in Trimble et ux v. Union 
Pacific Stages, 105 Utah, 457, 142 Pac. (2d) 674 
that where automobile in which plaintiffs' decedent 
was riding had been pulled onto the highway after 
sliding off the s1ippery pavement in a dense fog, 
at night, and, while parked on left shoulder of high-
way without lights burning, the automobile was 
struck by a bus, the bus driver was not negligent 
as a matter of law. 
The cases of Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 
227, 186 Pac. (2d) 592 and Shiba v. Weiss, 3 Utah 
(2d) 256, 282 Pac. (2d) 341 did not involve acci-
dents which happened at night, and merely announc-
ed the general conceded proposition of law that no 
person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a greater 
speed than is reasonable and prudent under the con-
ditions and having regard to the actual and poten-
tial hazards then and there existing. However, 
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neither of these cases holds that the mere fact that 
a collision occurs proves that the defendant was 
traveling at a speed greater than was reasonable 
and prudent. As said in Horsley v. Robinson, supra: 
"The mere happening of the accident of 
course does not prove that the defendants 
were negligent. Nor does the fact that the 
rate of speed at which they traveled brought 
them at the scene of the accident at the time 
that the Reinhardt car went out of control 
and into the course of travel of the bus, be-
cause that is something that they could not 
anticipate and guard against." 
Moreover, the case of Skiba v. W eiBs, supra, 
again involves a straight stretch of highway. As 
said by the court in that case: 
"The accident having occurred on a 
stretch of highway which was straight and 
level for at least a distance of about lj2 mile 
west of the point where the collisions occurred 
and there being no evidence of any obstruc-
tions to the view of the driver, the facts in 
the instant case are very similar to those in 
Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 
(supra) * * * ." 
A case on all fours with that before the court 
at this time is Hodges v. Waite, 2 Utah ( 2d) 152, 
270 Pac. (2d) 461. In that case the jury determined 
from the facts in the case that the proximate cause 
of the accident was occasioned by the negligence of 
the defendant, by reason of the fact that he had 
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stopped and parked his trucl{ and trailer upon the' 
Logan-Bear River Highway below a curve in said 
highway which obstructed the view of motorists 
driving down the canyon, and this factor alone was 
the sole proximate cause of the accident. In sustain-
ing the verdict the court said: 
. "The. ~efenda!lt in this case, in support 
of his position, relies on the Utah cases Niko-
leropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465-~· 214 P. 
304; Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products 
Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309; and Wright v. 
Maynard, Utah, 235 P. 2d 916. Mter a re-
view of the decisions in these cases, we con-
clude that the law enunciated there, as a hard 
and fast rule, does not apply in the instant 
case. In Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Pro-
ducts Co. the facts disclose that the defen-
dant's truck was parked upon the highway in 
the nighttime, which highway was straight, 
unobscured for over a mile, there were no 
curves, and no canyon highway was involved. 
In Wright v. Maynard, this Court held that 
the District Court committed error in direct-
ing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and 
held further that it was a question for the 
jury whether defendant's inability to stop his 
automobile was the proximate cause of the 
accident.'' 
"We are inclined to follow the law enun-
ciated by this Court in the case of Trimble v. 
Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 
2d 67 4, and we believe the rule laid down in 
said case is applicable to the situation and the 
facts in the instant case. In this case this 
Court said: 'Where automobile in which p1ain-
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tiffs' decedent was riding had been pulled 
onto the highway after sliding off the slippe~y 
pavement in a dense fog, at night, and, while 
parked on left shoulder of highway without 
lights burning, the automobile was struck by 
a bus the bus driver was not negligent as a matt~r of law', but a question of fact existed." 
Plaintiff's argument loses ,sight of the fact that 
the negligence of the defendant, should we assume 
for the purpose of argument that he was negligent, 
may not have been the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injury. In this connection the case of Wright 
v. Maynard, 120 Utah 504, 235 Pac. (2d) 916 is 
pertinent. In that case the appellant, at night, was 
traveling between 25 and 30 miles per hour when 
he rounded a slight bend in the road in the northern 
outskirts of Orem. Mter he rounded this bend his 
lights disclosed an unlighted car protruding in the 
highway on the side he was traveling and a man in 
white coveralls standing next to it waving at him. 
Appellant immediately applied his brakes but on 
account of the ice his car commenced sliding directly 
toward the other car and the man standing by its 
side, whereupon appellant swerved his car onto the 
shoulder east of the highway just to the east of the 
sta1led car. Just as he did this respondent jumped to 
the east in front of appellant's car and was hit. 
Citing the Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Co., 
Horsley v. Robinson and Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey 
cases, the court, in distinguishing this case, said : 
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"In the instant case, the facts are differ-
ell:t. f\lthough appellant was not able to stop 
Within the distance, he could observe sub-
stantial objects in front of him, still he saw 
them in time and had sufficient control of his 
car to turn aside and avoid running into them 
had they remained stationary. Had respon-
dent herein not moved from his position near 
the door of the stalled car and jumped to the 
east as appel1ant swerved his car to the east, 
appellant would have avoided hitting him. 
Under such a state of facts, the principles 
enunciated in the Nikoleropoulos and Dalley 
cases do not apply. Even though appellant 
may have been driving too fast under existing 
conditions to stop in time to avoid hitting 
substantial objects disclosed by his carlights 
had he kept on a straight course, still such 
inability to stop w!lere he had the ability to 
avoid a co1lision with those objects by some 
other means, such as turning aside, presents 
a different question from that decided in the 
two previous cases above referred to. It was 
a question for the jury to determine whether 
his ina'bility to stop was the proximate cause 
of the accident or whether that cause was the 
unexpected change of position by plaintiff. 
The court therefore erred in ruling as a mat-
ter of law that appellant's negligence was the 
proximate cause of the respondent's injuries." 
In the case we are now considering the evi-
dence shows that the plai11tiff heard the defendant's 
car coming, saw the lights from a distance of 600 
feet away at a time when she was only about a foot 
from the edge of the oil surface of the highway, 
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and could have avoided the accident simply by either 
remaining off the highway or by stepping off the 
highway. Under these circumstances the jury may 
well have found that the negligence of the defen-
dant, if any, was not a proximate cause of the injury 
to the plaintiff. 
By our argument that the rule of the Dalley 
v. Midwestern Dairy Products Company case does 
not apply to this case, we do not mean to infer that 
defendant is not subject to any restriction, for we 
believe that he is still subject to the rule that no 
person shall drive a vehicle on the highway at a 
speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under 
the conditions then and there existing, which is 
in effect what the court told the jury in its Instruc-
tion 6A (R. 69). To hold that the Dalley v. Mid-
western Products Company rule does apply in a case 
where the view of the driver is obstructed by curves 
in the road would be to utterly disregard the reali-
ties of present-day driving and to impose upon the 
drivers of vehicles a standard of conduct with which 
it would be impossible for them to comply. A person 
driving a vehicle down a canyon at night, where the 
lights would alternately be shining directly into a 
canyon wall or out over the valley below, would 
either have to practicarly "feel" his way around 
each curve or proceed at the risk of being negligent 
should he collide with another object on the high-
way. 
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Not only can the verdict of the jury in this 
case be sustained upon the theory that the defen-
dant was not negligent or, if negligent, that his 
negligence was not the proximate cause of the ac-
cident, but upon the further theory that the plain-
tiff's own negligence was the proximate, or at least 
a proximate, cause of her own injury. The evidence 
shows that she and Ralph Crane and the Osbornes 
had been together all afternoon and evening, during 
which time there had been considerable drinking. 
And while she states that when she saw the defen-
dan's automobile 600 feet away she was too scared 
to move, the jury may have found that her senses 
had been dul1led and her ability impaired.to the point 
where she was unable to respond to the situation. 
Moreover, there is considerable evidence to the effect 
that the Osborne vehicle was parked without lights 
on the traveled portion of the highway and while 
she did not park the vehicle she, as a reasonable 
and prudent person, could not have been oblivious 
to the dangerous situation which had been created 
and, being conscious of the situation, may have 
been guilty of contributory negligence in attempting 
to cross behind said vehicle and into the left door 
of the vehicle when it would have been much safer 
for her to have approached the vehicle from the 
right side and to have entered the vehicle through 
one of the right doors. 
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This, of course, presumes that she and Mrs. 
Osborne actually left the road and went up on the 
hill to go to the bathroom. The two puddles of water 
would indicate that they may never have left the 
highway but had gone to the bathroom behind the 
Osborne vehicle, in which event the jury may have 
found them guilty of negligence in placing them-
selves in this position of danger. In this connec-
tion we have already cited the case of Wright v. 
Maynard, supra. The court's attention is also in-
vited to Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. 
(2d) 495; Reid v. Owen, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d) 
680; Cox v. Thompson, 254 Pac. (2d) 1047; and 
Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah (2d) 224, 265 Pac. (2d) 
401. 
Illustrative of the doctrine laid down in these 
cases is Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 
719. In that case plaintiff and his wife were cross-
ing the main street of Logan, Utah from east to 
west at a point between intersections. They stopped 
somewhere over the center line of the highway on 
the west side of the street to allow south bound 
traffic to pass. Plaintiff was gazing in a southwest-
erly direction when defendant's automdblie ap-
proaching from the north struck plaintiff and in-
jured him. Plaintiff's wife had seen the impending 
danger and stepped out of the way. A verdict was 
directed in favor of the defendant by the lower court 
and affirmed on appeal, the court saying: 
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"Appellant was aware of the fact that 
he was taking a chance in crossing the street 
at a place contrary to law. He should also 
have known that a driver of a vehicle would 
not ordinarily anticipate the presence of 
pedestrians on the street at the time and 
place of the accident. Knowing that his pres-
ence might not be anticipated and knowing 
that traffic on the west side of the road was 
approaching from the north and with nothing 
of importance to distract his attention, it was 
appellant's duty to watch the traffic he knew 
was approaching his location. * * * Having 
omitted to continue to watch, he failed to 
exercise the degree of care required of a pedes-
trian who leaves a place of safety and places 
himself in a position of peril. A greater de-
gree of care is necessary upon the part of a 
pedestrian who undertakes to cross a city 
street at a prohibited place than is placed on 
one who uses a marked crosswalk. * * * " 
And, finally, the jury in this case may have 
concluded that the defendant Leo George Eastman 
was not driving the car but that the car was driven 
by Kenneth R. Parry and that he was not acting 
under the control or direction of the defendant at 
the time. Such was the testimony of both Kenneth 
Parry (R. 309, 310) and the defendant Leo George 
Eastman (R. 356). 
Mere ownership of an automobile does not es-
tablish a prima facie case that the owner is liable 
for damages caused by the negligence of the driver. 
See Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 Pac. (2d) 
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493. The presence of the owner in a vehicle being 
operated by another does raise a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the owner has control and direction 
of it. This, however, is a rebuttable presumption. 
See the case of Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 
Pac. (2d) 1049, 109 A. L. R. 105. As is said in 
Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, Volume 5, page 158: 
"A man may, however, be a guest in his 
own automobile, and an owner, who, although 
present in his car while it is being driven by 
another not his agent, is present merely as 
a guest and has no control of the machine, 
which is not being used in the futherance of 
his business or undertaking, is not liable, in 
absence of any statute imposing liability for 
the negligence of such person in operating it." 
The evidence in this case shows that the defen-
dant and Kenneth Parry were not on any business 
of the defendant but that Kenneth Parry had mere-
ly wanted to drive the automobile and the defendant 
had permitted him to do so (R. 309). So we see that 
it would have been error for the court to have in-
structed the jury, as contended by the plaintiff, 
that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law, for the reason that the jury might 
reasonably have found under the evidence in this 
case that the defendant was not even driving his 
automoblie; if not driving that he was not liable 
for the acts of the person who was driving; that if 
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he was driving or was responsible for the actions 
of the driver he was not guilty of any negligence; 
and, even if he was guilty of negligence, the negli-
gence may not have been the proximate cause of the 
injury to the plaintiff, the same having been caused 
by her own negligence. 
POINT 2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING OR EXCLUDING CERTAIN EVIDENCE OR 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY. 
Plaintiff complains of the actions of the court 
in permitting certain _evidence, exc1uding certain 
evidence and in instructing the jury in a certain 
manner. We will attempt to cover those matters 
in this section of our brief. 
A. Admission of Evidence 
The plaintiff complains that the court allowed 
the witness Lyle Bates to make certain marks upon 
photographs and give certain opinions about blood 
spots, anti-freeze spots and skid marks which should 
not have been allowed. He refers us to the Record 
on pages 33'7, 339 and 350. Let us examine that 
Record. 
The Record shows that the witness had testified 
about certain conditions which he found at the 
scene of the accident and he said on page 337 that 
he found two spots which he determined to be blood 
stains. He was then asked to make a circle on a 
photograph around the two spots which he deter-
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mined to be blood stains, when plaintiff's counsel 
objected to his making circles on the picture. That 
was the only objection made, the only ground given, 
and the court overruled the objection and allowed 
the witness to make a circle on a picture. We sub-
mit that this was not only proper but that it could 
in no way prejudice the plaintiff. 
On page 339 of the Record the same wit-
ness was asked if a certain picture was a picture 
of the Osborne automobile (see Exhibit 37). There 
was never any contention made that the automobile 
in Exhibit 37 was not the automobile purported to 
be shown ( R. 340) . Moreover, the court sustained 
the plaintiff's objection and counsel for the defen-
dant carried on for three pages of the Record laying 
a foundation, finally identifying the automobile by 
the license number on the automobile and showing 
that that license number was the same as was shown 
on the police report by the investigating officer. 
On page 350 of the Record the same witness 
was shown Exhibit 43 and asked to draw a line to 
the side of the skid marks he had previously testified 
about. P1aintiff's counsel objected on the ground 
that it would destroy the photograph, but was over-
.ruled. The witness was then asked to put an out-
line around anti-freeze he had previously testified 
about. Again plaintiff's counsel objected to making 
marks on the photograph. The witness was then 
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asked to put a circle around what he had previously 
identified as blood stains, which was again objected 
to and again overruled. 
We submit that allowing the witness to so mark 
the photographs lay within the discretion of the 
• 
court and the plaintiff was not prejudiced in any 
way by the court's allowing the exhibits to be mark-
ed. None of the objections recited were, as plaintiff 
infers, to the qualification of this witness to identify 
lilood spots, anti-freeze and skid marks. 
B. Evidence Excluded. 
The evidence which the plaintiff claims the 
court erroneously excluded was the hospital records. 
Reference to the Record will show that these were 
identified by the Custodian of the Hospital Records, 
Hortense Wood, as the hospital records and that 
Dr. Lamb, plaintiff's physician, was allowed to use 
these records and testify at great length both from 
the information found on the hospital records, the 
x-rays and other information he may have had (R. 
184 to R. 214). On page 254 of the Record plain-
tiff's counsel proferred all of the hospital records 
as an exhibit to the case. Objection was made on 
the ground that they had not been properly verified 
by Dr. Lamb or anyone else, with the statement 
that defendant would have no objection to those 
parts of the hospital records which Dr. Lamb him-
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self signed or made out but that he had not speci-
fically identified that part of the record. This objec-
tion was sustained on the ground that the hospital 
records contained reports made by~ number of per-
sons, such as nurses and others (R. 254) and that 
the plaintiff had failed to lay a proper foundation 
for their admission, not having shown that the per-
sons who made the entries were unavailable or that 
the records were made in the regular course of busi-
ness of the hospital. 
As was said in the case cited by defendant's 
counsel in his objection (R. 254), Clayton v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, 92 Utah 331, 85 
Pac. (2d) 819: 
"N'one of the cases there cited as support-
ing admissibility of hospital records go so 
far as appellant would have us go in this 
case. Before such records can be admitted, in 
the absence of a statute, the offering party 
must show the necessity of admitting the 
records without requiring the person or sever-
al persons who made the records to testify. 
He must then show the custody from which 
the records were taken and that they were 
prepared in the due course of hospital work." 
C. Instructions To The Court. " 
Plaintiff complains of that part of Instruction 
6A wherein the court, after instructing the jury 
that an operator must operate at a speed at which 
he is able to stop his vehicle within the distance 
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of his headlights, goes on to qualify the rule with 
the statement: 
"But in connection with this instruction 
you must consider the evidence of the high-
way and the conditions, to determine whether 
the lights would shine on the highway far 
enough ahead for the driver to stop before 
the impact in this case occurred.'' 
This is exactly what this court has said the 
ru1e is in the cases of Hodges v. Waite and Wright 
v. Maynard, supra, as we have discussed in Point 
1 of our Brief. The court then goes on to say: 
'"This rule of law that I have given you 
does not apply on a curve but only on a section 
that is sufficiently straight for a person to 
stop within 350 feet which is the required 
range of his headlights. If you find that in 
consideration of the bends in the road, and 
the conditions existing at that time, that the 
driver of the defendant's automobile was driv-
ing faster than an ordinary prudent man 
would have driven, then you should find the 
driver negligent, and in that event, the negli-
gence would also be a proximate cause of the 
collision." 
The plaintiff then questions, what does the 
court mean by a curve? We think the definition of 
what the court means by a curve is implicit in the 
instruction itself, that is, a section of road that is 
not sufficiently straight for the lights of a car to 
remain on the highway and reveal objects 350 feet 
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ahead. Of course, whether or not the road in the area 
in which this accident happened was so curved was 
a question of fact to be ascertained by the jury from 
the evidence in the case and not to be decided by 
the court. 
What in effect the court told the jury by this 
instruction is that an automobile must be equipped 
with lights which will reveal persons and vehicles 
at a distance of at least 350 feet, and that he must 
so drive and so control his automobile as to be able 
to stop within that distance, except in situations 
such as where there is a curve on the highway where 
the lights could not shine upon the road for a dis-
tance of 350 feet, but that in those instances the 
driver is still required to exercise ordinary and 
reasonable care. We submit this is a correct state-
ment of the law. 
Plaintiff complains of Instructions No. 12, 13, 
and 14 (R. 79, 79B and 80) and states that these 
instructions over-emphasize drinking and intoxi-
cation as to the plaintiff. 
In Instruction No. 12, which is a long instruc-
tion and has to do with the plaintiff's failure to 
move out of the pathway of the oncoming automo-
bile, the jury is instructed that they may consider 
a number of things in determining whether an or-
dinary prudent person would have stepped aside. 
The instruction is quite long and detailed and only 
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one phase of that instruction deals with intoxica-
tion, when the jury is told that one of the things 
they may consider is plaintiff's condition of sobriety'. 
By Instruction No. 13 the jury were told that 
if they found from the evidence that the plaintiff 
was under the influence of alcohol to the extent 
that she failed to appreciate the danger or to make 
a reasonable effort to avoid a co1lision, the plain-
tiff was negligent. This is similar to Instruction No. 
6d, in which the jury were told that if the defen-
dant's ability to drive was impaired as a result of 
the use of intoxicating liquor this was negligence. 
Of course, Instruction No. 14 merely defined 
intoxication and_ applies equally to the plaintiff and 
the defendant. 
Both the plaintiff and the defendant had a 
right to have the theory of his case or defense pre-
sented to the jury, and that is all that the court has 
done in this instance. To have done less would have 
been error. 
By its Instruction No. 6e, of which plaintiff 
a1so complains, the jury was instructed: 
"There is evidence in the case that Ken-
neth R. Parry did not have an operator's li-
cense. Even though you might find Kenneth 
R. Pa·rry was the driver of said automobile, 
you are not to consider this lack of a license 
as the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries." 
What this instruction has to do with the fact 
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that the plaintiff had been drinking all night, as 
argued by the plaintiff, is not apparent. It does 
withdraw from the jury the question of whether 
or not his having a license to drive and whether or 
not the fact that his license had been revoked by 
reason of drunken driving was a proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries, and does eliminate them 
from the jury's deliberation in arriving at liability 
in this case. This, however, is good law. The fact 
that Kenneth R. Parry did not have a driver's li-
cense, or the fact that his license had been revoked 
was not, and cou1d not under the circumstances 
of this case have been, the proximate cause of this 
accident. 
Plaintiff then complains of Instruction No. 9 
(R. 76), which instruction merely outlines what 
the jury must find in order to return a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff and, of course, tells them 
they must find defendant negligent, and in doing 
so uses general language, to-wit: That he was 
negligent (a) in that said driver was driving too 
fast for existing conditions; (b) that said driver 
was not keeping a proper lookout; (c) that said 
driver was operating a car while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. 
The question of whether or not the driver was 
driving too fast for existing conditions and whether 
or not the driver was keeping a proper lookout go 
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to the point of whether or not the defendant was 
over-driving his lights, which issue plaintiff claims 
was not covered. If by her criticism the plaintiff 
means that defendant's lights were faulty, we find 
that no such issue was involved in the case. See the 
court's pre-trial order on page 13 of the record in 
which the plaintiff's contentions are set out. There 
are six contentions of negligence, but none of these 
says anything about the defendant's automobile hav-
ing been equipped with faulty lights, nor is there 
any evidence whatever in the record that the de-
fendant's lights were faulty. If this is what was 
intended by the plaintiff, to have given such an in-
struction would have been error. 
Instruction No. 11, which is criticized by the 
plaintiff as being a duplication of Instruction No. 12, 
defines the plaintiff's duty to keep a reasonable look-
out for automobiles using the highway and to con-
tinue to look and observe the automobile as it ap-
proached her. Whereas Instruction No. 12 is ad-
dressed to a different point, that is her duty to 
move back from the path of danger if an ordinary 
prudent person would have stepped aside under 
similar circumstances. 
For this reason both instructione were neces-
sary and in view of the fact that it is admitted that 
the plaintiff did actually see defendant's automobile 
neither instruction is prejudicial. 
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Instruction No. 15 did not tell the jury that 
they might not consider the bias and prejudice, if 
any, of Lyle Bates in determining what credibility 
to give to his testimony, which is what plaintiff 
would infer. It merely told the jury it was entirely 
immaterial whether the defendant or either party 
carried insurance protecting such persons against 
loss or liability and that the jury were to disregard 
any reference to insurance and in no wise speculate 
or consider the existence or non-existence of insur-
ance in arriving at their verdict. There is nothing 
whatever said in the instruction as to what weight 
is to be given to Lyle Bates' testimony. 
Plaintiff cites a number of cases in her argu-
ment to the effect that the court should not give in-
consistent instructions; that the instructions should 
be applicable to the evidence and the respective 
theories of the case; and that they should not ac-
centuate the duty of one person and minimize the 
duty of the other, or vice versa. However, we submit 
that the instructions given in this case do not violate 
any of these principles. We submit that an analysis 
of all the instructions as a whole will show that they 
adequately define both parties' theories; that they 
were not inconsistent and were sufficiently detailed 
as to apply to the evidence in the case. Reviewing 
the instructions only generally: 
Instruction No. 1 merely outlines the 
contentions of both parties. 
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Instruction No. 2 has to do with the bur-
den of proof. 
Instruction No. 3 is a "stock" instruc-
tion defining what is meant by the burden of 
proof. 
Instruction No. 4 contains "stock" defi-
nitions of the term "negligence" and the like. 
Instruction No. 5 merely lays down the 
test for negligence. 
Instruction No. 6 directs the jury that 
they should first decide whether the driver 
of the defendant's automobile vvas negligent 
and, if so, whether the negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 
Instruction No. 6a we have already dis-
cussed and has to do with the duty of an in-
dividual to drive his car within the range 
of his headlights on a straight road. 
Instruction No. 6b has to do with wheth-
er or not the defendant was driving too fast. 
Instruction No. 6c has to do with the 
defendant's ability to avoid the accident. 
Instruction No. 6d has to do with wheth-
er or not the defendant was driving under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
Instruction No. 6e tells the jury that 
they cannot find that the fact that Kenneth 
R. Parry did not have a driver's license was 
a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. 
Instruction No. 6f has to do with the 
question of agency between Kenneth R. Parry 
and the defendant. 
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Instruction No. 7 further amplifies this 
question of agency. 
Instruction No. 8 tells the jury they 
should not allow sympathy to influence their 
verdict. 
Instructions No. 9 and 9a define the is-
sues between the parties. 
Instruction No. 10 defines "contribu-
tory negligence". 
Instruction No. 11 defines the plain-
tiff's duty to maintain a lookout for automi-
biles on the highway. 
Instruction No. 12 has to do with the 
~u~y of the plaintiff to step back and avoid 
InJury. 
Instruction No. 12a is merely a state-
ment of the rule that a driver who is faced 
with a sudden emergency cannot be expected 
to exercise the same care as if he had time 
for cool and deliberate deliberation. 
Instructions No. 13 and 14 deal with 
intoxication. 
Instruction No. 15 tells the jury they 
may not take into consideration whether 
either of the parties is protected by insurance. 
Instruction No. 16 has to do with dam-
ages. 
Instruction No. 17 is a "stock" instruc-
tion on damages. 
Instruction No. 17a tells the jury that 
Mrs. Osborne is not a party to the lawsuit. 
Instruction No. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26 and 27 are "stock" instructions. 
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You will note from this admitted1y brief re-
sume that the instructions are not inconsistent, do 
not over-emphasize the plaintiff's duties and ade-
quately present the theory of the plaintiff's case. 
CONCLUSION 
As we said at the outset, there are really only 
two questions to be resolved in this appeal. Might 
the jury have found as they did under the evidence; 
and were the issues properly submitted to them? 
Both of these questions must be answered in the 
affirmative. The evidence did not show negligence 
on the part of the defendant as a matter of law. 
The jury might well have found that the defendant 
was not negligent, in fact, might have found that 
he was not even driving his vehicle and that he was 
not responsible for the negligence of the person who 
was. Plaintiff attempts to bring this case within 
the rule announced in Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy 
Products Company supra, that a person must drive 
his car so as to be able to stop within the range 
which his headlights will or ought to reveal objects 
or persons upon the highway. We find that that is 
not the rule to be applied in this case, but rather the 
law enunciated by Hodges v. Waite, supra, and 
Wright v. Maynard, supra, to the effect that this 
rule does not apply when conditions of the highway 
are such that the lights are precluded from shining 
on the highway, as in the case of fog, or are diverted 
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from the highway, as is the case of curves. 
The jury might well have further found that 
the proximate cause of this accident was the failure 
of the plaintiff to remove herself from a position of 
danger after having observed the defendant's auto-
mobile, either by reason of a disregard for her own 
safety or because her physical ability to respond 
to the situation had been impaired by the drinking 
she had admittedly done during the evening. 
Nor does the record show that any evidence 
which should have been admitted or evidence which 
should have been excluded was either wrongfully 
admitted or excluded to the plaintiff's prejudice. 
It is most always easy to take instructions bit 
by bit or excerpt by excerpt and convincingly argue 
that they were either erroneous or prejudicial. How-
ever, when we consider the instructions as a whole 
in this case we find that the jury was adequately 
and properly instructed on all of the issues in the 
case and the plaintiff's theory; that the instructions 
were not slanted in the defendant's favor; and that 
there is no error in the instructions which was pre-
judicial to the plain tiff's rights. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the re-
sult reached in this case should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
DON J. HANSON 
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